20
The implications of China's economic transformation for modern economics Justin Yifu Lin chna started ts transton from a planned economy to a market economy at the end of 1978. in the past 28 years, chna's average annual gross domestc product (GdP) growth rate was 9.7 per cent and the trade growth rate averaged 17.2 per cent. chna's GdP, measured by the offical exchange rate, now ranks fourth and, by purchasng power party, second n the world. chna's trade volume s currently the thrd largest n the world and ts foregn reserves, whch exceed Us$1.2 trllon, are the largest.
in the first 12 years of reform, from 1978 to 1990, chna's GdP grew by 9 per cent annually and ts trade volume at 15.4 per cent. durng ths perod, urban per capta ncome grew 5.9 per cent annually, whle that of rural areas grew at a spectacular rate of 9.9 per cent (Natonal Bureau of statstcs 2002:17, 94, 148) . lvng standards n chna ncreased sgnficantly and dspartes between urban and rural areas decreased.
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the reform process was poorly understood by the economcs professon and many economsts had lttle confidence n chna's transformaton.
1 most economsts beleved that a market economy should be based on prvate property rghts-a feature that the chnese economy apparently lacked at that tme. chna's state-owned enterprses were not prvatsed; a dual-track resource allocaton system was prevalent, wth state plannng stll playng an mportant role alongsde markets n resource allocaton. These pessmstc economsts thought that although chna's economc transton was blessed wth benefical ntal condtons, 2 the dual-track system would soon lead to efficency loss, rent seekng and nsttutonalsed state opportunsm (Balcerowcz 1994; Woo 1993; sachs and Woo 1994, 1997; Qan and Xu 1993) . some economsts even clamed that, despte ts ntal success, chna's dual-track approach to economc transton would eventually lead the economy to a dsastrous collapse (murphy et al. 1992; sachs et al. 2000) .
At that tme, most economsts were optmstc about the transton n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe due to the fact that those countres were followng polcy recommendatons based on the basc prncples of exstng modern economcs-that s, neoclasscal economcs. 3 The most representatve of these polces was the 'shock therapy' mplemented n Poland, the czech republc and russa. such an approach had three prmary components: prce lberalsaton, rapd prvatsaton and macroeconomc stablsaton through elmnaton of fiscal deficts (lpton and sachs 1990; Blanchard et al. 1991; Boycko et al. 1995) . These components are consdered to be the bass of an efficent economc system n neoclasscal economcs.
economsts recommendng shock therapy also knew the transton from one economc system to another took tme and that t was costly to cast asde vested nterests. Nevertheless, they predcted optmstcally that the economes would grow after sx months or a year, after an ntal downturn resultng from mplementaton of the shock therapy (Brada and kng 1991; korna 1990; lpton and sachs 1990; Wles 1995) . Accordng to ther arguments, the former sovet Unon and eastern europe would soon out-perform chna, even though the first two had nsttuted ther reforms much later than chna. chna's progress would be lmted by nconsstences n ts economc system exacerbated by ncomplete, dual-track reforms.
As descrbed, however, chna's average annual GdP and trade contnued to grow at hgh rates-10.3 per cent and 15.2 per cent, respectvely, n 1991-2000-the former at hgher rates than n the early reform perod. inflaton, as measured by the retal prce ndex, was 5.5 per cent per annum n the same perod (NBs 2006) . in the same 10 years, the countres that mplemented shock therapy experenced serous nflaton and economc declne. russa's nflaton rate reached 163 per cent per annum, whle Ukrane's reached 244 per cent per annum n 1991-2000. The cumulatve output declne n countres n central and southeastern europe and the Baltc states reached 22.6 per cent; n countres of the commonwealth of independent states, output fell 50.5 per cent. in 2000, russa's GdP was only 64 per cent of what t had been n 1990, whle n Poland-the best performng economy n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe-GdP ncreased only 44 per cent, compared wth 1990.
meanwhle, the Gn coefficent of ncome per capta-a measurement of ncome dsparty-ncreased from 0.23 n 1987-90 to 0.33 n 1996-98 n countres of central and southeastern europe and the Baltc states, and from 0.28 to 0.46 n countres of the commonwealth of independent states (World Bank 2002) . overall, the countres that mplemented shock therapy experenced great dfficultes n ther reforms-n contrast wth the optmstc expectatons of most economsts. Poland's economc record s the best among the countres of the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, however, t dd not mplement shock therapy completely. Although prces n Poland were lberalsed, most of ts large state-owned enterprses have yet to be prvatsed (World Bank 1996; dabrowsk 2001) .
in the 1990s, the chnese economy dd suffer myrad problems, as predcted by those economsts who favoured shock therapy. For example, the state-owned enterprse reforms ntated n the early 1980s have yet to be completed. interregonal and urban-rural dspartes ncreased after the declne n the 1980s. The financal system remans weak. As noted above, however, chna's GdP and trade contnued to grow. moreover, lvng standards mproved rapdly, especally n urban areas. economc development n chna not only promoted the welfare of the chnese people, t contrbuted greatly to the world economy. durng the east Asan financal crss n 1997-98, the chnese currency (the renmnb) dd not deprecate, whch played an mportant role n the quck recovery of the east Asan economes from the crss. chna's economc transformaton dd not follow the standard polcy prescrptons based on exstng modern economcs, and performed outstandngly. Those countres that followed the standard polcy recommendatons n ther transtons performed poorly. Ths dramatc contrast ndcates that there s an nherent lmtaton n establshed modern economcs-represented by neoclasscal economcs-n analysng the problems n economc transtons. Ths chapter suggests drectons for mprovement of neoclasscal economcs.
Neoclassical economics, the viability assumption and the formation of a planned economy
Theores are used to explan and predct real-world phenomena. if they fal to do so, the theores must have some fundamental flaws and should be revsed or abandoned (Fredman 1953) . exstng neoclasscal economc theores have performed reasonably well n explanng what happens n the economes of ndustralsed countres, but they have been less successful n explanng what happens n transtonal economes and developng countres.
Neoclasscal economcs has a well-known assumpton of ratonalty: gven the choces avalable to a decson maker, he or she wll choose what s consdered to be the best opton. There s, however, another assumpton-the 'vablty' assumpton-that s ncorporated mplctly by neoclasscal economsts n ther analyses. The term 'vablty' s defined wth respect to the expected profit of a firm n an open, compettve market. if a normally managed company s expected to earn a socally acceptable normal profit n an open, compettve market, t s vable. For a non-vable company, ts establshment or contnung operaton s possble only f t receves external subsdes or protecton. 4 By mplctly assumng that all firms are vable n ther analyses, economsts wll conclude that a firm that does not earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market must lack normally efficent management. They nfer that problems must stem from corporate governance, ncentve mechansms, property rghts arrangements or other market nterventon that mpede the firm's management. Problems n corporate governance, property rghts arrangements and so on dd exst n socalst economes. Therefore, under the nfluence of exstng neoclasscal economc theores, t was beleved that the success of state-owned enterprse reforms and the transton to a market economy depended on the elmnaton of those factors that mpeded a company's normal management. shock therapy s based on ths theoretcal foundaton.
snce the ncepton of neoclasscal economcs, economsts n ndustralsed countres have conducted most theoretcal exploratons. Ther research, however, focuses manly on ssues relatng to ndustralsed countres. it s reasonable for them to assume that firms are vable, snce-except for those n a few sectors-governments n ndustralsed countres rarely provde subsdes and other types of support drectly to companes. if a company wth normal management s not expected to earn acceptable profits n the market, t wll not be set up n the first place. if a non-vable firm s establshed due to msleadng nformaton or mstakes n judgment, nvestors wll wthdraw ther nvestments and close down the firm. consequently, firms that can survve n an open, compettve economy must be vable: that s, they are expected to earn acceptable profits under normal management. it s therefore approprate to have an mplct vablty assumpton n neoclasscal economcs for analysng phenomena n ndustralsed countres.
As argued by ln (2003), however, many firms n transtonal economes and developng countres are not vable-that s, they cannot earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market even though ther management s normally efficent. The non-vablty of these firms arses from the fact that the sector n whch they operate, the products they produce and the technology they use n producton are nconsstent wth the economy's comparatve advantage as determned by the factor endowment structure-namely, the relatve abundance of labour, captal and natural resources.
Fgure 20.1 llustrates the dea of vablty n an open, compettve market that produces only one product wth two factors: captal and labour. curve 'i' s an soquant. each pont on the soquant represents a specfic technology or combnaton of captal and labour requred to produce a gven amount of product. 5 The technology represented by 'A' s more labour ntensve than that represented by 'B'. in an open, compettve economy, the least-cost technology s the best. if 'c' s the socost lne n the economy, the adopton of technology 'A' costs the least, whle the adopton of any other technology wll make the firm ncur losses n an open, compettve market. For example, f a firm adopts the technology represented by 'B', t s expected to ncur a loss equvalent to the dstance from 'c' to c 1 . market competton wll make firms that adopt technologes other than 'A' non-vable. Therefore, n an open, compettve market wth gven relatve prces of labour and captal, the vablty of a firm depends on ts choce of technology. only the firm that chooses the least-cost technology s vable.
Whether the economy's socost lne corresponds wth 'c' or 'd' depends on the economy's endowment structure. When labour s relatvely abundant and captal s relatvely scarce, the socost lne wll have the flatter slope of 'c' rather than 'd'. When captal becomes relatvely abundant and labour relatvely scarce, the socost lne wll change to somethng lke lne d n Fgure 20.1. Therefore, the vablty of a firm n an open, compettve market depends on whether ts choce of technology s consstent wth the comparatve advantage of the economy's endowment structure.
Ths concluson can be extended to mult-product and mult-ndustry cases. That s, n an open, compettve market, whether a firm s vable depends on whether or not ts ndustry, product and technology choces are consstent wth the comparatve advantages determned by the economy's endowment structure. 6 if a firm's choces are not consstent wth ths condton, t cannot earn acceptable profit n an open, compettve market even under normal management and ts survval requres government subsdes and/or protecton.
A good example that llustrates the vablty concept s the agrcultural sector n Japan. The majorty of farms n the Japanese agrcultural sector are small and owned by ndvdual owners/operators. There are, consequently, no problems of property rghts and corporate governance.
7 Japan s, however, a country endowed wth only lmted arable land and t has no comparatve advantages n land-ntensve agrcultural products such as gran. it s also a hgh-wage country wth no comparatve advantages n labour-ntensve agrcultural products such as vegetables and frut. Although Japan's agrcultural sector s famous for ts delcate, ntensve cultvaton, the survval of Japanese farms reles on hgh levels of government fiscal subsdes and tarff protectons, wthout whch most Japanese farms could not survve. 8 many state-owned enterprses n transtonal economes face the same vablty problems as Japanese farms, due to the fact that these enterprsesespecally large state-owned enterprses-are establshed by governments wth the am of competng wth ndustralsed countres n captal and technologyntensve sectors, even though ther economes are stll low ncome and captal scarce. These strateges clash wth the comparatve advantages of the countres' partcular economes.
in fact, the tradtonal centrally planned systems n socalst economes were formed endogenously to support and protect these non-vable heavy ndustral firms that were not consstent wth the economy's comparatve advantages.
9 socalst countres-ncludng russa and chna-were captal scarce, backward, agraran economes before they adopted a centrally planned system. in a captal-scarce, agraran, low-ncome country, the establshment of a firm n a captal-ntensve heavy ndustry must overcome numerous dfficultes. Frst, constructon of the firm takes a long tme. second, the key equpment and technologes necessary for the firm must be mported. Thrd, the ntal nvestment s dauntngly large. At the same tme, n a low-ncome agraran country, the economc surplus from each perod of agrcultural producton s very small and scattered wdely and thnly across numerous small rural farms. As a result, such an economy has three dstnct characterstcs. Frst, captal s relatvely scarce due to the lack of economc surplus, makng market-determned nterest rates extremely hgh. second, exportable goods are lmted n varety and quantty. consequently, foregn exchange s scarce and market-determned exchange rates are hgh. Thrd, the moblsaton of resources for a project that requres large, lump-sum nvestment s dfficult due to the fact that the economc surplus s lmted and scattered wdely across the economy. The conflcts between the three characterstcs of a low-ncome, agraran country and the three characterstcs of nvestng n captal-ntensve heavy ndustres n the country requre the government to adopt specal nsttutonal arrangements to make such nvestment feasble.
specfically, to make long-gestaton nvestment projects feasble n chna, russa and other socalst countres, governments artfcally depressed nterest rates; to lower the costs of mported equpment and technologes, governments dstorted exchange rates by artfically overvalung the domestc currency; and to moblse enough surplus for the large, lump-sum nvestment projects, governments gave the firms monopoles n ther output markets and artfically depressed prces of all knds of nputs-ncludng wages-so that the firm could accumulate enough surplus for ts own nvestment. As wage rates were suppressed, governments were requred to provde workers wth low-prce lvng necesstes. The dstortons n nterest rates, foregn exchange rates, wage rates, nputs and the prce of necesstes resulted n shortages of captal, foregn exchange, raw materals and necesstes. To ensure that these scarce resources would be allocated to firms n the prorty sectors, plannng and admnstratve allocaton of resources accordng to the state plans were requred. Ths was the logc for the emergence of a tradtonal, centrally planned system n socalst economes.
Furthermore, f the firms were n prvate hands, the state could not ensure that the surpluses moblsed through these dstortons would be nvested n heavy ndustres accordng to the state's plans. Therefore, the firms were natonalsed so that the state could drectly control the rghts to nvest the surplus. in addton, even though the firms were owned by the state, the state could not overcome the problems of nformaton asymmetry and ncentve ncompatblty. if company managers had dscretonary powers, moral hazards would ensue, resultng n a reducton of the surplus avalable for nvestment. To prevent the eroson of the surplus, the government deprved managers of any autonomy n nput, output and market decsons and n personnel appontments, wage settngs and other manageral dscretons (ln and Tan 1999) .
in fact, the varous nsttutonal arrangements-such as dstortons n nterest rates, foregn exchange rates, prces of raw materals, wage rates and commodty prces, the replacement of the market mechansm wth plan allocaton, and the deprvaton of manageral autonomy-are all endogenous to the fact that the firms n the government's prorty sectors are not vable n an open, compettve market (ln et al. 2003) . in the jargon of neoclasscal economcs, these arrangements are 'second best'. They are requred for the maxmum moblsaton of surpluses n dfferent sectors for nvestment n the prorty sectors. Wth such arrangements, a backward agraran country such as chna could develop nuclear bombs and launch satelltes wthn a short tme. The resource allocaton, however, was poor, due to nvestments beng made n non-vable firms. The ncentves for workers and managers were low due to the manager's lack of autonomy and the dsconnecton between performance and reward. As a result, the whole economy was nefficent.
10 moreover, wthout the government's nterventon, an economy wll mport the goods produced n ndustres n whch the economy does not have comparatve advantages and export goods n ndustres n whch the economy has comparatve advantages.
Under the comparatve advantage-defyng (cAd) strategy, however, mports wll become smaller due to efforts to produce goods that ndustres are supposed to mport, and exports wll become smaller due to the fact that resources are dverted from ndustres n whch the economy has comparatve advantages to ndustres n whch t does not have comparatve advantages. Therefore, the trade-dependent rato-measured by the total value of exports and mports as a share of GdP-under the cAd strategy wll be much smaller than n a country that follows the comparatve advantage-followng (cAF) strategy. The case of chna s a good example. The trade-dependent rato n 1978 was 9.75 per cent. After chna made the transton from the old strategy, the rato ncreased to 64.1 per cent n 2005. most dstortons n the socalst planned economes were formed endogenously by the government for the purpose of facltatng the development of non-vable firms n sectors that were not consstent wth the economy's comparatve advantages. snce many exstng firms were not vable, t s not surprsng that exstng neoclasscal economc theores-wth ther mplct vablty assumpton-cannot provde adequate solutons for problems n socalst and transtonal economes. if the problem of non-vablty s not elmnated, and f the government s unwllng or unable to let the nonvable firms go bankrupt, elmnatng dstortons and reformng nsttutonal arrangements accordng to the exstng neoclasscal economc theores are lkely to turn the arrangements from second best to thrd best. Therefore, the reforms, at best, wll not acheve the ntended effects and, at worst, wll exacerbate the stuaton.
Neoclassical economics and policies of economic transition
The model of the world we have n our mnds wll shape our understandng of the real world (North 2002) . exstng neoclasscal economc theores-formulated n ndustralsed market economes-have proved that neffectve corporate governance, deficent property rghts arrangements and government nterventon n resource allocaton are harmful to economc efficency. economsts traned n neoclasscal economcs tend to thnk that exstng neoclasscal economc theores are approprate models for the analyss of problems n transtonal economes when they observe famlar problems n corporate governance, property rghts and government nterventon. They fal to see the endogenety of these problems to the non-vablty of firms n the government's development strategy. invted by governments n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe to desgn ther transton polces, neoclasscal economsts reached a remarkable consensus about the need to elmnate the dstortons and government nterventon mmedately (summers 1994:252-3).
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The most prevalent reform polcy advce accordng to neoclasscal economc theores s the 'Washngton consensus', whch calls for strengthenng fiscal dscplne, ncreasng publc nvestment n areas wth 'publc goods' characterstcs to mprove ncome dstrbuton, enlargng the tax base, unfyng exchange rates, lberalsng trade, removng foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) barrers, prvatsng state-owned enterprses, lftng regulatons on market entry and protectng prvate property rghts (Wllamson 1997) . The shock therapy proposed by economsts for the transtonal economes n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe was based on ths Washngton consensus (kolodko 2001). Therefore, we can understand why, n the 1990s, economsts wth neoclasscal tranng were more optmstc about reforms n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, whch mplemented shock therapes, than about the pecemeal, gradual, dual-track reform approach beng taken n chna.
Neoclasscal economc theores not only have an mpact on economsts workng on ssues related to ndustralsed market economes, they nfluence economsts workng on ssues related to other economes. For example, n the famous debate on socalsm n the 1930s, economsts such as oscar lange, who beleved that the socalst planned economy could acheve the same allocaton efficency by smulatng markets, and Fredrch hayek, who beleved that the socalst economy was doomed to fal due to nformatonal problems, took the vablty of firms n a socalst economy as an mplct assumpton n ther analyses.
Neoclasscal economc theores also nfluence economsts lvng n socalst countres when they analyse the problems of ther own economes. Janos korna of hungary s one of the most emnent economsts specalsng n socalst economes. one of hs most mportant contrbutons s the concept of the 'soft-budget constrant' (korna 1986). in many socalst countres, state-owned enterprses sufferng from poor performance can ask for preferental treatment and subsdes, whle prvate firms n market economes have no choce but to go bankrupt. korna proposed that the soft-budget constrant was the man reason for a lack of ncentves to mprove efficency and for the prevalence of moral hazards n state-owned enterprses. he attrbutes the exstence of the soft-budget constrant to the paternalsm of socalst governments towards state-owned enterprses. Therefore, he argued that reform n property rghts and the severance of firm-state connectons must be carred out n order to elmnate the soft-budget constrant and to promote company efficency. in korna's theoretcal framework, state-owned enterprses are mplctly assumed to be vable. however, the soft-budget constrant n socalst economes emerges essentally from the vablty problem of state-owned enterprses. in an open, compettve market, these firms would not be able to attract nvestment n the first place and, f they had nvestment due to msjudgment or other reasons, nvestors would not contnue to support ther operatons once the msjudgments were clarfied. To establsh these non-vable firms, socalst governments must protect and subsdse them. Because of ncentve ncompatblty, the managers of state-owned enterprses have ncentves to attrbute ther losses to nsufficent government support or protecton, even though the losses arse from ncompetent operatons and poor manageral dscreton. Because of nformaton asymmetry, governments cannot know what levels of protecton and subsdy are adequate. Therefore, governments cannot resst the companes' requests for more support and the companes' budget constrants become soft (ln and Tan 1999). Therefore, the soft-budget constrant of state-owned enterprses results essentally from the problem of non-vablty rather than from the paternalsm of socalst governments. smlarly, even n non-socalst countres, the soft-budget constrant wll exst n non-vable firms f the government s responsble for the establshment of those firms. The large chaebols n korea are llustratve of ths fact.
if the vablty problem s the root of the soft-budget constrant, we can predct that f the vablty problem s not solved, the soft-budget constrant wll not be elmnated, even though the socalst government s overthrown and all firms are prvatsed. in fact, that s what happened n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe. in these countres, democratcally elected governments replaced socalst governments and shock therapy and prvatsaton were mplemented, but the soft-budget constrant stll exsted and n many cases ncentves for prvatsed company managers to bargan for more support and protecton became sgnficantly hgher than the ncentves for state-owned enterprse managers.
12 Accordng to the World Bank's studes, after full-scale prvatsaton n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, the subsdes that firms receved from governments dd not decrease-n some cases, they even ncreased (World Bank 1996 . 13 At the same tme, taxaton capactes were weakened sgnficantly after shock therapy. Ths, combned wth hgh subsdes to companes, led to extremely hgh nflaton n these countres.
it s not only that the shock therapy formulated accordng to neoclasscal economc theores dd not work n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, many reform measures based on such theores or on the experences of ndustralsed economes created problems n chna.
14 The reform of stateowned enterprses s an example.
15 At the begnnng of the reforms n the early 1980s, t was beleved that the root of the problems wth state-owned enterprses was the lack of autonomy of managers, wth dsconnecton between performance and rewards. Therefore, decentralsaton reforms were ntated to ncrease manageral autonomy and to allow state-owned enterprses to retan a certan share of ther profits to be used at ther own dscreton. These measures were effectve n plot experments, but were neffectve when they were mplemented naton-wde. emprcal studes found that the reform ncreased state-owned enterprses' productvty but ther profitablty declned (ln et al. 2001) . many scholars thought the dscrepancy arose from the arrangement of property rghts because the firms were owned by the state but were operated by managers, who were not the owners and dd not have ncentves to ncrease returns to the equty owner-the state. Based on ths dagnoss, the reform measures, startng n the late 1980s, promoted modern corporate governance n state-owned enterprses wth the establshment of boards of drectors and supervson boards to delneate clearly the owners' rghts. A publcly lsted company was consdered to have the best corporate governance and property rghts arrangements, snce the value of the firm would be evaluated before t went publc and, after beng lsted, equty would be held by the state and nonstate nvestors. in addton to montorng by the board of drectors, non-state shareholders would have ncentves to montor the company's management and operatons snce they would care about the returns on ther nvestment.
Nevertheless, n realty, after a few years, the financal performance of the majorty of lsted companes dd not dffer from those of non-lsted companes (ln 1999) . in the begnnng, the poor performance of lsted companes was attrbuted to the fact that only small, ndvdual nvestors owned the non-state stocks and these nvestors had lttle ncentve to montor the managers because the returns for ther efforts would be neglgble. These small shareholders were thought to be nterested n the short-term prce changes n stocks, whch made stock-markets hghly speculatve, wth hgh turnover rates and short holdng perods.
in ndustralsed countres, nsttutonal nvestors play an mportant role n equty markets. An nsttutonal nvestor has the capacty to hold a substantal porton of a lsted company's shares and thus has greater ncentve to montor the nvested company's management than does an ndvdual nvestor. in addton, an nsttutonal nvestor can hre professonals to analyse the lsted companes' reports and operatons. if an nsttutonal nvestor decdes to hold the shares of a company, that nvestor s lkely to hold the shares for a long tme.
chnese researchers thought that the ntroducton of nsttutonal nvestors would stablse chna's stock-markets, so nvestment funds were ntroduced n 1998; however, speculaton n the stock-markets dd not stop. makng thngs worse, many nvestment funds not only speculated n the stock-market, they manpulated stock prces. how could ths happen? The reason les n the problem of the non-vablty of these lsted companes. Wthout the ablty to earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market, these companes cannot afford to dstrbute dvdends to shareholders, whch means that small ndvdual shareholders as well as nsttutonal nvestors can profit only through speculaton on stock prces. Wth large amounts of money at ther command and a small porton of stocks n crculaton for each lsted company, 16 nsttutonal nvestors resorted to manpulaton of stock prces to make profits (ln 2001, 2004) .
in concluson, for firms to survve n the markets of ndustralsed countres, they must be vable. Therefore, vablty s an acceptable mplct assumpton n neoclasscal economc theores for explanng phenomena n ndustralsed countres. Polcy reforms based on neoclasscal economc theores or the experences of ndustralsed countres have faled to acheve ther ntended goals n transtonal economes because most firms n transtonal economes are not vable.
The prevalence of the viability problem and the expansion of the neoclassical framework
companes' vablty problems and the resultng nsttutonal arrangements not only appear n transtonal economes, they are wdespread n developng countres. on seeng the decsve role of ndustralsaton n promotng the economc and poltcal powers of ndustralsed countres, many leaders of developng countres that acheved ndependence after World War ii attempted to develop advanced ndustral sectors comparable wth those n ndustralsed countres aganst ther own comparatve advantages (chenery 1961; krueger 1992) . 17 They dd so by ntervenng n factor prces, the financal system, nternatonal trade and nvestment-wthout realsng that the ndustral structures of ndustralsed countres were determned endogenously by ther own partcular factor-endowment structures. Through such efforts, developng countres were able to establsh companes n advanced sectors. Those companes were not, however, vable n an open, compettve market, and government nterventon on prces, resource allocaton and market competton were requred to ensure ther survval. such nterventon led nevtably to the prevalence of rent seekng and crony captalsm, whch resulted n unequal dstrbuton of ncome, low efficency and socal and economc nstablty (krueger 1974; ln 2003) .
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Ths phenomenon also exsted n some newly ndustralsed economes. korea's stuaton serves as a good llustraton. Tawan has hgher per capta ncome than korea, but the chaebols n korea are more technologcally advanced and captal ntensve than comparable firms n Tawan.
19 durng the east Asan financal crss n 1998, Tawan's foregn exchange rate devalued by only 15 per cent and t was the only economy that acheved postve growth n east Asaexcept for manland chna, whch was nsulated from the crss by ts currency nconvertblty and control of captal accounts. Tawan grew by 4.5 per cent n 1997 and 5.7 per cent n 1998, whch was remarkable consderng the terrble external envronment at that tme. Tawanese firms manfested themselves as beng compettve and vable. The korean economy collapsed durng the east Asan financal crss and korea had to borrow heavly from the internatonal monetary Fund (imF). After the elmnaton of state protecton and subsdes to large firms-n accordance wth the condtons of the imF's rescue package-20 out of 30 korean chaebols went bankrupt, whch showed that these firms were not vable and could not survve wthout government protecton.
in market economes, the protectve measures provded to non-vable firms are smlar to those n socalst economes: depresson of nterest rates, admnstratve allocaton of bank loans to provde cheap funds to non-vable firms and establshment of varous mport barrers to prevent competton from ndustralsed countres. The protected firms are n sectors that clash wth the economy's comparatve advantages and produce lttle economc surplus. The firms, consstent wth the economy's comparatve advantages, face dscrmnaton and eventually experence dfficultes. As a result, the funds that could be moblsed for development purposes dry up. if external borrowng s not allowed-as was the case n inda, Pakstan and most socalst countres-economes stagnate. if external borrowng by firms or governments s permtted-as n latn Amerca, korea, Thaland and indonesa before the east Asan financal crss-debt crses ensue (krueger 1992).
When debt crses occur, countres have to seek rescue packages from the imF under exstng nternatonal financal arrangements. such packages usually come wth condtons, requrng a seres of reforms and structural adjustments n the recpent countres. The concept of such condtons s tself based on the Washngton consensus, whch requres that macro-polcy dstortons be corrected, that governments cease nterventon n banks and companes and that corporate governance be mproved. The Washngton consensus-reflectng the basc prncples of neoclasscal economc theores-mplctly assumes that firms are vable. Therefore, the condtons am to elmnate protecton and subsdes wthout any attempt to solve the companes' vablty problems. if non-vable firms consttute only a small share of the economy-as s the case n Bolva-shock therapy s possble and growth can resume quckly when ncreases n efficency offset the shock of bankruptcy suffered by non-vable companes n the wake of Washngton consensus measures. if, however, non-vable firms consttute a large share of the economy-as s the case n transtonal economes-shock therapy would lead to an 'l' curve rather than a 'J' curve n the pattern of GdP growth after mplementng the therapy (ln 1998). 20 snce the exstence of non-vable firms s a common realty n socalst, transtonal and developng economes, t s napproprate to assume mplctly that companes are vable n the analyss of the economc problems n these economes and to formulate reform polces based on such assumptons and analyses. Problems of vablty should be taken nto consderaton n analysng economc development and transton. on reflecton, neoclasscal economcs has been enrched through a process of abandonng unrealstc and mplct assumptons. The basc framework of neoclasscal economcs was lad down n Alfred marshall's Principles of Economics n 1890. Among others, marshall's framework had several mplct assumptons, ncludng perfect nformaton, zero transacton costs and the vablty of firms n an open, compettve market. economc theores are nstruments to help people explan what has been observed and to predct what wll happen. Accordng to Fredman (1953) , the acceptablty of a theory depends not on whether the assumptons of the theory are realstc, but on whether the mplcatons drawn from the theory are consstent wth emprcal observatons. marshall's framework s very powerful n explanng and predctng a number of economc phenomena n market economes. For example, when the prces of certan products ncrease, purchases of those products wll generally declne. The assumptons n marshall's framework, however, also lmt ts explanatory power on certan ssues. For example, under the assumpton of perfect nformaton and zero transacton costs, there wll be only one prce for a product n a compettve market, allowng lttle room for prce dfferentaton.
one of the man contrbutons by George stgler at the Unversty of chcago was to abandon the mplct assumpton of perfect nformaton and to ntroduce the concept of ncomplete nformaton nto economcs, wth the added consderatons of the value of nformaton and the cost of nformaton collecton and processng. hs contrbuton makes nformaton an mportant varable n modern economc analyss. other economsts-such as Joseph stgltz, George Akerlof and mchael spence-further emphassed that not only s nformaton ncomplete, t s often dstrbuted asymmetrcally among producers, consumers, prncples and agents. Furthermore, accordng to marshall's framework, resource allocaton by markets s the most efficent opton. knowng ths, t s dfficult to explan why there are firms operatng n accordance wth non-market allocaton mechansms. ronald coarse contrbuted to neoclasscal economcs by abandonng the zero transacton cost assumpton and ntatng research on contracts, property rghts and non-market nsttutons.
economc theores are lke maps. A map s not the real world; t s a convenent tool to help us understand the surroundng envronment and what wll be seen n dfferent drectons. maps, by nature, must be smplfied, but f some mportant landmarks are gnored or ncorrect, the maps wll mslead us. When we dscover mstakes n a map, and smlarly n a theory, correctons must be made. due to the prevalence of vablty problems n socalst economes, transtonal economes and developng countres, the mplct assumpton of vablty should be relaxed n analysng the economc problems and desgnng polces to solve problems n these economes. Transton and reform polces should be desgned accordng to the understandng that many firms are not vable. The success of transton and reform depends on the creaton of condtons that make non-vable firms vable, n leu of followng shock therapy and Washngton consensus reforms uncondtonally.
in addton, the objectve pursued n natonal development must be reformulated. Tradtonally, poltcal leaders, economsts and the socal élte n developng countres amed to develop advanced technologes and ndustres smlar to those of the most ndustralsed countres wthn the shortest tme. The structures of ndustry and technology that are consstent wth an economy's comparatve advantages are, however, determned endogenously by the economy's exstng factor endowment structure. ignorng the exstng dfferences between ts own endowment structure and that of ndustralsed countres, the government n a developng country often tres hard wth good ntentons to develop the same ndustres and technologes as those n ndustralsed countres. in effect, the government's efforts make companes n the prorty sectors non-vable because they lack the ablty to survve n open, compettve markets. Therefore, the government has to subsdse and protect these companes through prce dstortons, nterventon n resource allocaton, and so on. rent seekng, the soft budget constrant, macroeconomc nstablty, ncome dspartes, stagnaton and crses are the consequences of the government's development attempts n spte of the ntal good ntentons.
Based on the concept of vablty, the objectve of natonal economc development should be to upgrade the economy's endowment structure. Wth such upgradng, companes n open, compettve markets wll upgrade ther ndustral, product and technologcal levels accordngly n order to ensure ther compettveness n the market (ln 2003) . snce the endowment of land (and natural resources) n a country can be treated as gven, the upgradng of the endowment structure means an ncrease n the amount of captal to each worker. captal comes from the accumulaton of economc surplus. To upgrade the endowment structure rapdly, a maxmum economc surplus should be produced n each perod, and a large proporton of ths surplus should be saved for captal accumulaton. if a country develops ts ndustres, technologes and products along the lnes of ts exstng comparatve advantages, ts economy wll be most productve, produce the maxmum possble surpluses, create the hghest possble returns to captal and have the hghest ncentve to save. consequently, the upgradng of the factor endowment structure n the economy wll proceed at ts maxmum speed. companes' decsons wll be based on product prces and producton costs, but not on the factor endowment structure n the economy. Therefore, the government should mantan openness and sufficent competton n the market so that the prce structure wll reflect the relatve abundance of the factor endowment structure.
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Viability and economic transition companes n heavy ndustres prortsed by the government n tradtonal centrally planned economes are not vable n open, compettve markets. The objectve of the transton from a tradtonal centrally planned economy s to establsh an open, compettve market economy. in the process of transton, however, the vablty problem of those firms n the sectors nconsstent wth the economy's comparatve advantages turns from mplct to explct. Whether the transton wll be stable and successful depends very much on how the vablty problem s solved.
Non-vable firms cannot survve n open, compettve markets wthout government subsdes or protecton. The shock therapy adopted n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe attempted to elmnate all dstortons and government nterventon smultaneously, or n a short perod. if mplemented forcefully, shock therapy nevtably led to large-scale bankruptcy and unemployment, thus promptng economc collapse and socal nstablty. such results are, understandably, not acceptable to a functonng government. consequently, many governments n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe had to find ways to provde protecton or subsdes contnuously to a large number of non-vable firms, resultng n the embarrassng stuaton of shock wthout therapy (Galbrath 2002) . chna has adopted a gradual, pecemeal, dual-track approach snce ts transton started n 1979: on one hand, the chnese government has relaxed ts strct control of resource allocaton and has allowed new entres to sectors n whch the economy has comparatve advantages; on the other hand, the government has contnued to provde protecton and support to firms n tradtonal sectors to buffer them aganst the threat of bankruptcy, whle takng measures to reform them. The first track enhanced the efficency of resource allocaton, created a new stream of resources and resulted n rapd economc growth and trade expanson. The second track prevented the collapse of the economy durng the transton process. Ths dual-track approach has mantaned socal and economc stablty, acheved dynamc growth and ensured the transton has been a Pareto or kaldor mprovement (ln et al. 1996 ). chna's transton towards a market economy depends, however, on a final soluton to the vablty problem of firms n tradtonal sectors. snce the vablty problem s not yet solved, the chnese government has been requred to contnue ts nterventon n markets n order to protect or subsdse nonvable firms-and such nterventon comes wth consequences. For example, along wth chna's rapd economc growth n the transton process, the share of non-performng loans n the four bg state-owned commercal banks has ncreased sharply, corrupton s wdespread and regonal ncome dspartes are wdenng. To a large extent, these problems arse from the fact that state-owned enterprses stll depend on government subsdes and protecton to survve. After 1983, the form of chnese government support to state-owned enterprses changed from drect fiscal appropraton to offerng low-nterest loans from the four state banks. Untl now, more than 70 per cent of loans from the four state banks went to state-owned enterprses, but due to ther poor performance, many state-owned enterprses have been unable to repay the loans. Therefore, the banks have accumulated large amounts of non-performng loans.
The government also lmts the market entry of prvate nterests nto certan sectors to gve state-owned enterprses n those sectors a monopoly poston. Therefore, rent seekng to obtan preferental loans or market-entry lcences s prevalent among state-owned and non-state-owned enterprses, addng to wdespread corrupton. in addton to subsdsng state-owned enterprses, the government artfically depressed the prces of agrcultural products and mnerals under the tradtonal plannng system. such prce dstorton has contnued snce the reforms as a means to subsdse the non-vable stateowned enterprses.
The comparatve advantages of eastern chna le n manufacturng ndustres; those of central chna le n agrculture; and those of western chna le n mnerals and natural resources. snce the reforms began, the eastern regon has made huge progress n the development of manufacturng ndustres by takng advantage of the superor geographcal and market condtons and has ncreased substantally mports of low-prced agrcultural and mneral products from the central and western regons. in essence, the relatvely poor central and western regons have been subsdsng the development of the relatvely rch eastern, ndustral regon. regonal dspartes are wdenng as a result. if the vablty problem of state-owned enterprses s solved, there wll be no reason to contnue subsdsaton and protecton through low-nterest loans, monopolstc practces and the depresson of prces for agrcultural and raw materals. The remanng dstortons and government nterventon can then be elmnated (ln et al. 2001 ).
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The vablty problem of state-owned enterprses can be solved accordng to four dfferent strateges, dependng on the nature of the state-owned enterprses' outputs (ln et al. 2001) . The first group ncludes manly the defence-related state-owned enterprses, whose producton-whch s captal and technology ntensve-runs aganst chna's comparatve advantages, but whose outputs are essental for natonal securty. For ths group of state-owned enterprses, drect fiscal appropraton s necessary for ther survval and the government should drectly montor ther producton and operaton. it s reasonable to expect that there are only a few state-owned enterprses n ths category.
The second group also requres ntensve captal and technologcal nputs for ther producton, but ther outputs are not senstve to natonal securty and they have large domestc markets. examples of ths category are the telecommuncatons and automoble ndustres. For ths category, the government can adopt a 'market-for-captal' approach to gan access to captal from nternatonal markets and remove the adverse mpact of the domestc endowment structure on these firms' vablty. There are two ways to acheve ths goal: one s to encourage state-owned enterprses to go publc on nternatonal equty markets; the second s to set up jont ventures wth foregn companes and gan drect access to foregn technologes and captal. chna moble, chna Telecom and chna Petroleum have followed the first approach and many automoble makers n chna have followed the jont-venture approach.
The thrd category of state-owned enterprses has lmted domestc markets for ther products and thus ths group cannot adopt the market-for-captal approach. The way for them to solve the vablty ssue s to make use of ther engneerng and manageral capactes and to shft ther producton to labourntensve products, whch have large domestc markets and are also consstent wth chna's comparatve advantages. The most famous example of a firm followng ths approach s the colour-televson maker changhong. Ths firm used to produce old-style mltary radar. After swtchng to the producton of colour televsons, the firm has domnated the chnese market and s very compettve n the nternatonal market. most state-owned enterprses have advantages n engneerng and manageral personnel. if they are gven the opportunty to shft ther producton lnes to labour-ntensve products, many of them can become vable. The fourth group conssts of non-vable firms that lack engneerng capacty and are thus unable to shft ther producton to new markets. These state-owned enterprses should be allowed to go bankrupt.
After the vablty problem of the exstng firms s solved, whether or not a firm can earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market becomes the responsblty of the firm's managers. The performance of a firm wll depend on the corporate governance, ncentve mechansms and other factors-as dentfed n neoclasscal economcs. The government wll no longer be responsble for a firm's performance. only then can the reform of nsttutons that are nherted from the tradtonal centrally planned system, wth the functons of subsdsng and protectng state-owned enterprses, be carred out thoroughly and the transton from a planned economy to a market economy be completed.
Conclusion
in ths chapter, i have shown that modern neoclasscal economcs dd not play a drect role n helpng chna's formulaton of successful transton polces to a market economy and that those countres that followed transton polces based on modern neoclasscal economcs performed poorly n the process. The reason for the falure of neoclasscal economcs to provde useful polcy gudance for transton s because ts current framework, begnnng wth marshall, mplctly assumes that a company exstng n the market s vable: that s, the company s expected to earn a socally acceptable profit n an open, compettve market as long as t s under normal management. Wth ths mplct assumpton, the focus of economc research has been on the problems of corporate governance, the compettve envronment, the arrangement of property rghts and other factors that can obstruct a firm's normal management. many firms n transtonal economes and developng countres are, however, not vable because, due to ther governments' ambtous development strateges, they are n sectors that are nconsstent wth ther economes' comparatve advantages. in an open, compettve market, these firms, even under normally efficent management, wll not be able to earn acceptable profits. To set up these firms and to mantan ther contnuous operaton, governments provde them wth protecton and subsdes through prce dstorton, lmtatons on market competton, admnstratve allocaton of all knds of resources, and so on. The results of such nterventon are nadequate competton, lack of effectve corporate governance, rent seekng, dspartes n ncome dstrbuton, nefficent resource allocaton and, qute possbly, economc crss.
Under the rubrc of exstng neoclasscal economc theores, when desgnng polces for economc transton or crss management, economsts and government officals are lkely to focus on strengthenng property rghts, mprovng corporate governance, removng government nterventon n resource allocaton, and so on, to mprove the efficency of the market. They are not aware of the fact that such market-mpedng dstortons and nterventons are, n fact, endogenous to a company's vablty problem. When a majorty of the companes n an economy are non-vable, the mplementaton of these reform and transtonal polces sometmes leads to an awkward stuaton of shock wthout therapy, as n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, and the lost decades n other developng countres (easterly 2001; ln and lu 2004) . snce many exstng companes n socalst centrally planned economes, transtonal economes and developng countres are not vable, t s necessary to relax the mplct vablty assumpton n neoclasscal economcs when applyng the neoclasscal approach to study the problems n those economes. The explct consderaton of the vablty problem wll enrch neoclasscal economcs and help to define the economc functons of governments n developng countres, preventng them from adoptng cAd development strateges to set up non-vable firms and enablng them to acheve convergence wth ndustralsed natons n an expedent manner (ln 2003).
Notes
1 There were also economsts who held chna's reform n hgh regard. They nclude Jefferson and rawsk 1995; mcknnon 1994; mcmllan and Naughton 1992; Naughton 1995; sngh 1991; harrold 1992; Perkns 1992; and murrell 1991, 1992. 2 The ntal condtons that have been regarded as benefical to chna's transton nclude hgh proportons of cheap rural labour, low socal securty subsdes, a large populaton of overseas chnese and a relatvely decentralsed economy, whch helped to acheve some short-term progress. 3 The crtque n ths chapter s on the exstng economc theores, whch assume mplctly that the exstng firms n a market are vable, rather than on the neoclasscal economc approach, whch assumes that a decson maker s ratonal: that s, he or she wll make a choce consdered to be the best among hs or her avalable choces. i owe ths clarficaton to Gary Becker. 4 The term vablty was ntroduced formally n ln and Tan 1999. The most comprehensve analyss of ths concept can be found n ln 2003. 5 The curve can be consdered as the envelope of all dfferent knds of technologes that can be used to produce the product. 6 For detaled dscussons of a firm's vablty ssues n a mult-good and mult-sector context, see ln 2003. The term vablty refers only to whether a firm's choces of technology and product are consstent wth comparatve advantage determned by the economy's endowment structure. it s noteworthy that a vable firm mght not be profitable f ts management s poor. 7 The problem of corporate governance s due to the separaton of ownershp and control that leads to ncentve ncompatblty and nformaton asymmetry between owners and managers. if the same person s owner and manager of a firm, there wll be no problems of ncentve ncompatblty, nformaton asymmetry and moral hazard.
seeng that prvatsaton dd not help solve the soft-budget constrant or mprove efficency, many economsts realsed the mportance of mprovng corporate finance and market competton. As former chef economst of the european Bank and Vce-Presdent and chef economst of the World Bank, Ncolas stern, commented, '[G]ood corporate governance of publc firms and sound competton polcy are at least as essental for recovery as prvatzaton and lberalzaton' (stern 1996:8). Poland's former Frst deputy Premer and mnster of Fnance, Grzegorz kolodko (2000:ch.4), holds the same opnon. The fact that many shareholdng companes n chna dd not show sgnficant dfferences n ther financal ndcators from non-lsted companes after five years of beng lsted shows, however, that f the problem of vablty goes unresolved, good corporate governance and sufficent market competton wll not come about unless bankruptcy s permtted (ln and Tan 1999; ln et al. 2003 ). 14 snce 1978, when chna ntated ts reforms, the two most sgnficant changes-summarsed by deng Xaopng as the two 'unexpected results'-were the success of the household responsblty system (ln 1992) and the remarkable growth of townshp and vllage firms (ln and Yang 2001). These reforms were not desgned by reformers ex ante, but adopted by peasants spontaneously n practce. 15 regardng academc debates and polcy measures on state-owned enterprse reform, see ln et al. 2001. 16 in chna, about only 25 per cent of the total stock of a lsted company was ssued to non-state nvestors and could be traded n the stock-markets. The other 75 per cent was stll owned by the state and could not be traded n the stock-market. Among the 1,200 or so lsted companes, only a few have dstrbuted dvdends to stockholders (ln 1999). 17 The vew of former indan Prme mnster Jawaharlal Nehru s most representatve of ths. in 1938, before inda's ndependence, he was the Presdent of inda's state Plannng commsson. he wrote: '[i]n the context of the modern world, no country can be poltcally and economcally ndependent, even wthn the framework of nternatonal nterdependence, unless t s hghly ndustralzed and has developed ts power resources to the utmost. Nor can t acheve or mantan hgh standards of lvng and lqudate poverty wthout the ad of modern technology n almost every sphere of lfe' (Nehru 1946 (Nehru :413, quoted n srnvasan 1994 ). 18 such tendences characterse inda and latn Amerca. on inda, see swamy 1994. on latn Amerca, see cardoso and helwege 1992. 19 Take the nformaton technology (iT) sector as an example. Tawanese firms, such as Tsmc, manly do orgnal equpment manufacture (oem), whle korea's samsung and hyunda electroncs carry out ndependent research and development and product nnovaton. For a comparatve study of iT development strateges n Tawan and korea, see ln 2000. Furthermore, n the automoble ndustry, korea produces complete cars, whle Tawan s renowned only for parts producton. 20 The dfference n the shares of non-vable firms n the economy mght explan why the shock therapy recommended by sachs succeeded n Bolva but not n the former sovet Unon and eastern european economes. Bolva s a poor, small economy and the resources that the government could moblse to subsdse the non-vable firms were small. Therefore, the share of non-vable firms n the economy must also be relatvely small. stgltz 1998 also questoned the unversal applcablty of the Washngton consensus, but dd not consder the possble mpact of non-vable firms n developng and transtonal economes and ther lmtatons on polcy choces. 21 in a developng country, the government can also use an ndustral polcy to assst firms' upgradng of technology, product and ndustry n respondng to change n the economy's endowment structure by provdng relevant nformaton, coordnatng requred nvestments and compensatng for externaltes of nnovaton. The ndustry promoted by the ndustral polcy should, however, be consstent wth the comparatve advantages of the new endowment structure and, as such, the firms are vable n an open, compettve market (ln 2003). 22 Besdes the vablty problem, state-owned enterprses n chna have a problem of socal burdens. Before the economc transton, the nvestment n heavy ndustry provded lmted employment opportuntes. The government was responsble for urban employment and usually assgned several workers to a job, resultng n labour redundancy n state-owned enterprses. The workers also receved low wages, whch were enough only for coverng current consumpton. Before the transton, state-owned enterprses remtted all ther revenue to the government, and the government used fiscal appropraton to cover state-owned enterprses' wages, the pensons of retred workers and other expendture. Therefore, the labour redundancy and penson expendture were not burdens on the state-owned enterprses. After the reforms, state-owned enterprses started to be responsble for ther workers' wages and retrement pensons. The newly establshed town and vllage enterprses, jont ventures and other non-state firms are n sectors that are consstent wth chna's comparatve advantage and they do not have the problem of labour redundancy and unfunded pensons for retred workers. i call the ssue arsng from the vablty problem of the state-owned enterprses the 'strategc burden' and the addtonal cost arsng from labour redundancy and penson expendture the state-owned enterprses' 'socal burden'. Together, they consttute the stateowned enterprses' 'polcy burdens'. As long as these polcy burdens exst, the government s responsble for the firms' losses and the soft-budget constrant cannot be elmnated (ln and Tan 1999). There s a consensus n chna about the necessty for and the way to elmnate socal burdens. Therefore, the remanng ssue s how to solve the strategc burden.
